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One of the most essential but theoretically vexing issues regarding the notion of culture
is that of cultural evolution and transmission: how a group’s accumulated solutions to
invariant challenges develop and persevere over time. But at the moment, the notion of
applying evolutionary theory to culture remains littlemore than a suggestive trope.Whereas
the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory has provided an encompassing scientiﬁc
framework for the selection and transmission of biological adaptations, a convincing theory
of cultural evolution has yet to emerge. One of the greatest challenges for theorists is
identifying the appropriate time scales and units of analysis in order to reduce the intractably
large and complex phenomenon of “culture” into its component “building blocks.” In this
paper, we present a model for scientiﬁcally investigating cultural processes by analyzing
the ways people develop conventions in a series of LEGO construction tasks. The data
revealed a surprising pattern in the selection of building bricks as well as features of car
design across consecutive building sessions. Our ﬁndings support a novel methodology for
studying the development and transmission of culture through themicrocosmof interactive
LEGO design and assembly.
Keywords: cultural evolution, cultural transmission, joint action, joint attention, shared intentionality, materiality,
path dependence, schema theory
INTRODUCTION
Natural selection has proven to be a uniquely successful scien-
tiﬁc paradigm. By identifying the basic processes through which
organisms change, Darwin (1859) established a research pro-
gram that has not only revolutionized the study of life, but has
provided a template for what a comprehensive model of trans-
formation over time ought to look like. And with the additional
reﬁnements and achievements of the modern evolutionary syn-
thesis, many of the subtler mechanisms, including the way that
biological information is genetically transmitted, have yielded to
scientiﬁc inquiry and experimentation (Dobzhansky, 1937; Hux-
ley, 1942;Mayr, 1942). Moreover, because evolution—for themost
part—subsumes all aspects of biological life, it has been used not
only as an explanation of changes in biological form, but of the
behavior of organisms (Darwin, 1890; Lorenz, 1937; Tinbergen,
1951). Indeed, some theorists believe that the mysteries of human
behavior, and the achievements of human societies,mayultimately
ﬁnd their explanations in rigorous applications of evolutionary
theory to patterns of human interaction, potentially explaining
culture itself (Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976; Sperber, 1996). But
in spite of many attempts to adapt ideas from biological evolution
to the study of culture, beginning soon after the publication of
Darwin’s magnum opus (Spencer, 1864; Galton, 1869; Haeckel,
1900), the preliminary approaches have, as of yet, failed. This
includes even the impressively nuanced models of such 20th cen-
tury scholars as Steward (1955) andParsons (1966). But if theorists
of society have had the archetype of biological evolution to inspire
them for so long, why have they come up short in their attempts
to achieve something similar for culture? Is culture qualitatively
different than biology, so that attempting to create an “evolution-
ary theory” of culture is non-sensical, or a mere metaphor? In
agreement with a growing number of scholars (Boyd and Rich-
erson, 2005; Mesoudi, 2011; Sterelny, 2012), we hold that many
of the basic processes which undergird the evolutionary theory
of life apply to culture as well. Inspired by Darwin’s meticulous
study of details, we hypothesize that an evolutionary theory of
culture will develop through careful observations of the smallest
phenomena that can still be called “cultural.” And just as Dar-
win gradually came to an understanding of natural selection by
noting tiny differences among barnacles, ﬁnches, and other crea-
tures, an understanding of the evolutionary processes of culture
will likely derive from particularistic studies of culture’s “building
blocks.”
We identify these building blocks as skills that humanbeings are
uniquely predisposed to develop during infancy and childhood,
but only through engaging others in richly scaffolded1 cultural
contexts (Luria, 1976;Vygotsky, 1978; Hobson,2002; Rogoff, 2003;
Reddy, 2008). We use the term “skill” to indicate a theoretical
framework of human behavior as constituted by capacities of rela-
tionality to people and things in pre-existing, culturally engineered
1Scaffolding, in this case, refers to the alteration of the environment, and of the
instruction itself, to meet the learner’s needs. Like the use of scaffolding in con-
struction, the notion is that a set of temporary supportive practices and artifacts
are put into place to facilitate the construction process, until the project is self-
supporting or completed. Wood et al. (1976) were among the ﬁrst to use the term
in relation to teaching and learning.
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environments. Additionally, the term skill suggests a capacity that:
(1) is developed; (2) never achieves a ﬁnal state of enskilment, but
is essentially determined by the continued exercise of the skill; and
(3) depends upon all earlier uses of the skill, that is say, a skill
always has a “history.” It is upon the foundation of our “skills for
intersubjectivity” and our “skills for interobjectivity” that culture
is built. And to crib from Darwin (1859, 490): “. . .from so sim-
ple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful
have been, and are being, evolved.” But just as natural selection
was not apparent before Darwin’s studies, so cultural evolution
remains little more than a tantalizing mirage until its processes are
rendered visible. The theory of natural selection was developed,
and continues to be reﬁned, by studying physical organisms as
well as their ancestors’ fossilized remains. In order to make culture
visible, its processes must be operationalized in particular forms of
interaction and materialized in products of those interactions; the
object of studymust ﬁrst be an“object”before an empirical science
can truly begin. We attempted to accomplish this very thing in our
quasi-naturalistic joint action experiment.
In the study, pairs of participants were required to construct
four model cars using LEGO® building bricks (see Figure 1). The
pairs constructed their models in consecutive 10 min building
sessions and employed distinctive “modes of interaction” during
each of these sessions: egalitarian cooperation (EC), turn-taking
(TT), and hierarchical cooperation (HC).At the beginning of each
of the four sessions, participants were given written instructions
for one of these modes of interaction. For EC, participants were
directed to go about building their car however they sawﬁt. For TT,
participants took turns in designing the car: one person offered a
design suggestionwhile the other aided in constructing that feature
and then they would reverse roles. For HC, one participant served
as the“director”in chargeof designdecisions throughout the entire
session. Upon ending the ﬁrst HC session, participants reversed
roles in the very next session. After each 10 min building session,
we collected the car and remaining LEGO bricks and supplied the
pairs with an identical set of building bricks at the beginning of
the following session. The cars themselves served as our primary
source of data, as described in more detail below.
FIGURE 1 | Photo of participants building a car model.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Dynamics representative of larger cultural processes are at work
in this experimental task. The design and assembly of a model
car is a type of joint action, in which “two or more individu-
als coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a
change in the environment” (Knoblich et al., 2011). Much of what
goes by the name “culture” could be deﬁned in the same way (see
Risjord, 2012). Additionally, these actions are “embodied prac-
tices of mind” (Gallagher, 2005, 206–236) whose proper unit of
analysis is the coordinated dyad engaged in “participatory sense-
making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). As Risjord (2007, 414)
observes: “Culture is neither a psychological phenomenon nor
some kind of abstraction from individuals. It is the social interac-
tions themselves, perfectly public and observable, yet distinct from
any individual participant.” Culture may be thought of as some
arrangement of interlocking joint actions that build up from two
people to larger and larger groups. Joint action relies on joint atten-
tion, the mutual attendance to an object indexed by such things
as gaze following (Tomasello, 2008), and shared intentionality, the
capacity to develop shared goals and coordinate actions toward
the achievement of those goals (Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007;
Gallotti and Frith, 2013). Additionally, orchestrating these skills
in model car construction is an example of collaborative engage-
ment in which“agents share goals and action plans manifested in a
joint intention” (Tomasello et al., 2005). Numerous scholars have
suggested this ability for shared intentionality and cooperation to
be essential for culture (Tomasello, 1999b; Schönpﬂug, 2008; Boyd
and Richerson, 2009).
How could simple tasks performed in such short time scales
reveal anything substantial about cultural evolution? Joint actions
are forms of“microgenesis”(Werner, 1957; Rosenthal, 2004; Sinha,
2005, 1553), that is, developmental processes unfolding in “real
time.” And whether demonstrated through “triadic interactions”
between infants and caregivers (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978),
the assembly of LEGO models by adults (Clark and Krych, 2004;
Bjørndahl et al., 2014), or troops coordinating their movements
on a battleﬁeld—all exemplify microgenesis. Longer term pro-
cesses of cultural evolution, although undoubtedly more complex,
are built from microgenetic actions. Just as a biologist might
focus on macroevolution or microevolution (Filipchenko, 1927;
Dobzhansky, 1937), both exhibit the identical processes of natural
selection; the model of selection behind the rise of the dinosaurs
and the model of selection behind the antibiotic resistance of a
given species of Staphylococcus are one and the same. So while
studying long term changes of social organization is a viable
means to investigate the topic, we must turn to real time inter-
actions if we are to build an experimental science of cultural
evolution.
Skills for intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity has been deﬁned as “the sharing of experien-
tial content (e.g., feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic
meanings) among a plurality of subjects” (Zlatev et al., 2008). It is
marked by such things as shared emotions (Michael, 2011), empa-
thy (Scheler, 1954; Zahavi, 2008), and “resonance systems” which
lead us to experience, in some partial way, the“feeling”of an action
when watching someone else perform the action (Gallese, 2001;
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Gallagher, 2008). Many of the processes that get bundled together
in the term“intersubjectivity”begin to develop during infancy as a
set of skills: “. . .capabilities of action and perception of the whole
organic being (indissolubly mind and body) situated in a richly
structured environment. As properties of human organisms, skills
are thus as much biological as cultural” (Ingold, 2000, 5). The
development of these skills emerges from interacting with older,
more competent humans engaged in task-oriented patterns of prac-
tice, even if these practices are “mere play” (Hobson, 2002, 42; Di
Paolo et al., 2010, 72–78).
Trevarthen and Hubley (1978) discussed the easy imitation
of smiles, cooing, and interpersonal gaze by young infants as
“primary intersubjectivity” which begins to give way, around
9 months of age, to “secondary intersubjectivity.” Discussing this
more recursive form of intersubjectivity, Hobson (2002, 61) notes:
“Clearly, personal relations are not just about exchanging smiles
and coos and other endearing or not-so-endearing gestures with
someone else. They are also about sharing experiences of things.
Personal relations are about connecting with someone else and
making reciprocal emotional contact, but also about exchanging
points of view, or agreeing and disagreeing about this or that, or
sharing jokes. If we can clarify how infants engage with someone
else so that communication is about a third object or outside event,
then we may draw closer to seeing how they come to think about
things.” Infants begin to demonstrate secondary intersubjectivity
by participating in “triadic interactions” which involve “a referen-
tial triangle of child, adult, and the object or event to which they
share attention”(Tomasello, 1999a, 62). A classic task of this kind is
the rolling of a ball back-and-forth between child and caregiver. At
this young age, then, humans begin to ﬂuidly engage in practices
that introduce them to the conventionalized uses and meanings
of objects. Enculturation, the long term process by which a per-
son acquires the requisite languages, skills, and sensibilities of the
groups to which she belongs (Wexler, 2006; Kiverstein and Farina,
2011; Lende and Downey, 2012), depends on forms of social cog-
nition that develop from engaging in playful activities of this sort.
Itmay be signiﬁcant to note that human infants enjoy the processes
and practices of becoming a cultural being. Creating productive
research programs to investigate cultural evolution ought to look
for these sorts of enjoyable activities as indices of being on the
right path.
But the attraction to games and then stories that so marks early
stages of development are also forms of “serious play.” From these
activities norms, rules, and values are introduced to the child who
quickly begins to embody his particular culture’s mores (Sinha,
2009, 174–176). With these normative engagements with others
and with objects, the child also begins to intelligently observe and
act on regularities in the environment, a process called schemati-
zation (see Piaget, 1952). Schemas arememories that an individual
develops for recurrent features of the world which are sufﬁciently
open and ﬂexible to apply to “sets” or “categories” rather than
to idiosyncratic items (Bartlett, 1932; Rumelhart, 1980; McGraw,
2007). For an English-speaking person in the contemporary glob-
alized world, schemas would be typical for such things as “trees,”
“buildings,” and “ﬂags,” but probably not for “cyclotrons,” “hal-
berds,” or “transepts.” A schema for a car, for instance, would
include basic characteristics like“four-wheeled vehicle,”“possesses
an enclosed space for driver and passengers,” and a host of typi-
cal components (e.g., steering wheel, windshield, headlights). The
fact that people would use a modiﬁer before the term to iden-
tify items uncommon for the set (e.g., three-wheeled car, ﬂying
car, solar car) suggests the importance of common features in the
development and consolidation of schemas.
While schemas are routinely demonstrated in our daily inter-
actions, trying to ﬁnd them in language presents many challenges
that researchers have been wrestling with for decades (D’Andrade,
1995; Shore, 1996; Quinn, 2005). Sinha (2005, 1538) sug-
gests an alternative approach very much in line with our study:
“. . .cognitive and cultural schemas ﬁnd material realization—are
embodied—in the artifacts of material culture; and the way in
which such artifacts are themselves embedded in culturally appro-
priate, normative structures of action and interaction. In this
perspective,mind is socially distributed between people, andmen-
tal processes are supported by objects which embody and represent
them. Cognition extends beyond the individual; embodiment goes
beyond the skin.” Searching for schemas in the physical world
seems eminently preferable to inferring them from language since
investigating the materialization of schemas affords a more quan-
titative and empirical approach, as we demonstrate in the analysis
below.
Skills for interobjectivity
Unfortunately, the shadow of Descartes still looms large; just as
understanding mind apart from body is now perceived to be a
philosophical blunder, so trying to understand the social and the
cultural without considering its material basis revisits a distress-
ingly common “category mistake” (Ryle, 1949). Though culture
is made up of bodies, places, and things, many discussions about
culture would lead one to think it was composed of abstract forces
alone (see Latour, 2005). However, reﬂecting on people and social
forces without consideration of their material aspects and accom-
paniments reveals itself to be an impoverished substitute: try to
imagine Roman Catholicism without Bibles, churches, commu-
nion wafers, monasteries, cruciﬁxes, tombs, or Rome. Culture is
a particular coordination among “things” in the world, includ-
ing but not limited to bodies, places, structures, and technologies.
Coordination among these various things, through languages, cus-
toms, and rituals, does not exist apart from them. Even the notion
of a culture apart from the things in the world that make it up
turns out to be empty of content. One of the goals of this article
is to highlight the ineliminable materiality that goes along with
culture and, consequently, with cultural transmission (Sinha and
Rodríguez, 2008; Sinha, 2009). Discussions of cultural transmis-
sionmust take into account the fact that the social and thematerial
are necessarily linked, even if many scholars have seen the latter
as mere effect or consequence of the former. In fact, the social
and the material co-constitute one another, so that one cannot
reasonably discuss one without the other (Latour, 1996; Miller,
1998, 2005; Malafouris, 2013). Additionally, because of the differ-
ences, particularly in time scale, between behaviors, bodies, and
artifacts, each of these employs distinctive processes of cultural
transmission. Nevertheless, robust forms of cultural transmission
are demonstrable in each of these activities and structures, and
across their varying time scales, from the immediate effects of
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imitative learning between children and caregivers to the poten-
tially long lasting effects of writing manuscripts (Garrod et al.,
2007; Levy, 2012).
Philosophical discussions about intersubjectivity routinely fail
to mention the importance of objects and other features of the
physical world. But as Tomasello noted above, a triadic interaction
typically features an object as the vertex in a referential triangle
involving infant and caregiver. It is the object or eventwhich“joins”
the individuals’ attention (Sinha and Rodríguez, 2008, 357) and it
is “through participation in joint actions normatively structured
around the use of artifactual objects. . .that the child ﬁnds an entry
into the intersubjective realm of reasons for actions” (Sinha, 2009,
182). Peculiar objects, such as rolling balls or spinning tops, afford
joint attention processes in non-trivial ways. But beyond such
attention-grabbing toys, the material world is more than a can-
vas or blank slate for the play of human intersubjectivity. Enﬁeld
(2000, 42) observes that “representations are distributed across
the ‘community of minds’ via coordinated focus on this mediating
semiotic material—this may include gestures, proxemics, haircuts,
people’s faces, melodies, cultural artifacts, odors, plants, animals,
clothing, meteorological phenomena, among just about anything
else that two people can coordinate attention on.” Intersubjectivity
is thus dependent on “mediating structures” which include arti-
facts and the cultural practices that make sense of them (Hutchins,
1995). For instance, a person’s subjective perception of time is
based on intersubjective notions of what time is and how it is
measured, neither of which mean much without the calendars,
clocks, and watches that people routinely put to use for purposes
of interpersonal coordination (Williams, 2004).
The enaction of joint attention and shared intentionality,
typically considered to be intersubjective phenomena, are also
“interobjective.” The term interobjectivity came from Latour
(1996, 240) who observed that “if you set yourself the task of
following practices, objects and instruments, you never again
cross that abrupt threshold that should appear, according to ear-
lier theory, between the level of ‘face-to-face’ interaction and that
of the social structure; between the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’.”
Latour suggests that a careful description of all the mediators
involved—people, artifacts, and other structures—offers a win-
dow into processes operating across multiple time scales. Artifacts
may serve as powerful repositories of symbolic meaning, but more
than that, their built-in design and engineered affordances permit
later generations and even historically discontinuous peoples to
learn from and use these structures, often without explicit train-
ing (Malafouris and Renfrew, 2010; Hodder, 2012). These things
are sometimes discussed as forms of “external memory” through
which a society, wittingly or not, records its achievements for pos-
terity (Donald, 1991; Meskell, 2005). And as important sources of
information for social scientists, human artifacts are catalysts and
precipitates of human interaction; artifacts are for the social sci-
ences what fossils are for biology (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2008, 66).
In artifacts we can trace the transformation over time of human
interaction. Evolutionary theory has demonstrated the impor-
tance of studying fossils for working out the details of life’s history.
Similarly, the study of artifacts may provide the sort of objective
data necessary to unravel many of the key mysteries of cultural
evolution (Basalla, 1988; Kirsh, 2010; Johannsen et al., 2014).
Our study differs from many earlier investigations of cooper-
ative joint action by not only studying the intersubjective skills
necessary for such interaction, but also “seeing through things,” in
this casemodel cars, to derive conclusions about cultural processes
as a whole. Too many cultural theorists forego the archeologists’
emphasis on material culture, but it is precisely in material cul-
ture that many of the conventions, representations, and “ideas”
that others consider to be essentially private and abstract are to
be found in concrete form (Sinha and Rodríguez, 2008, 364). By
focusing on the dyad as our basic unit of analysis and by looking
at LEGOs as mediators of cooperation, we have tried to overcome
these limiting biases. In doing so, we foreground aspects of culture
that have been previously understudied, namely its basis in skills
for intersubjectivity and interobjectivity.
GOALS OF THE STUDY
We consider our study and its results to be a “proof of concept.”
This study presents methods for discerning, and quantifying,
schema-like intersubjective understandings in material form. By
designing experimental tasks that require pairs or groups to
act together toward achieving—via LEGOs—a materialization of
shared features of the environment (like CARS), concepts are
transformed into percepts. This approach was inspired by recent
work in cognitive science that looks to action and interaction for
insights about human cognition (Rogoff, 1990; Varela et al., 1992;
Hutchins, 1995; Goodwin, 2000; Noë, 2004; Stewart et al., 2010;
Knoblich et al., 2011; Dale et al., 2014). In fact, the notion of the
schema ought to be conceived as one feature in a much larger pic-
ture of human interaction. For schemas—just like words, phrases,
and behaviors—only come about through the developmental pro-
cesses that underlie human capacities in general, which derive
from the fusion of our skills for intersubjectivity with our skills
for interobjectivity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The data below derived from a larger project investigating human
interaction. Here, we present an analysis of the products of those
interactions (i.e., the model cars built by the pairs of participants).
The analysis of interaction measures is presented in additional
publications based on the study (Mitkidis et al., in review; Wallot
et al., in review).
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 74 participants from Aarhus University participated in
the experiment (average age: 23.5 years SD = 3.5 years) and were
randomly assigned to pairs. Using standardized forms in the sub-
jects’ native language, the pairs were instructed to cooperate in
the construction of model cars using LEGO building bricks. The
experiment lasted 75 min. At the end of the experiment partici-
pants were compensated with 350 DKK (≈47 EUR). The protocol
was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee for Region
Midtjylland, Denmark. All participants signed a written informed
consent form.
PROCEDURE
The 37 pairs of participants used LEGO building bricks to con-
struct model cars during four consecutive 10 min sessions. At
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the beginning of each building session, subjects were given a new
box of LEGOswhich contained the same building bricks present in
every other session. Also, participants were given different instruc-
tions on how to go about building a car together during each
session. The order in which the instructions were given was ran-
domized for each pair of participants. Subsequent data analysis
revealed that neither the modes of interaction (EC, TT, and HC)
nor their order ended up being salient since the results described
below demonstrate very strong carry-over effects from earlier to
later sessions; if anything, the modes of interaction might have
worked against this effect. Additional publications based on this
study utilize results based on these modes of interaction and dis-
cuss their signiﬁcance (Mitkidis et al., in review; Wallot et al., in
review). At the end of each session, the model car and remain-
ing LEGOs were removed from the room and the car was later
photographed, both as an assembled model as well as a set of dis-
assembled building bricks (see Figure 2). Each car’s pieces were
counted and categorized using a unique identiﬁer for the type and
color of each LEGO brick.
RESULTS
To evaluate similarity between any two cars, the number of differ-
ent pieces they shared in common was calculated. Afterward, the
FIGURE 2 | A disassembled car model.
number of common pieces was divided by the overall number of
different pieces used in both cars to account for the fact that bigger
cars will tentatively show greater overlap of component pieces by
chance alone.
To evaluate whether there was an overarching pattern across
all pairs that reﬂected participants’ understanding of the concept
of a car, rank-order distribution was constructed using all pieces
from all cars. As can be seen in Figure 3, the number of pieces
that were used to build cars scaled logarithmically to the rank
order of pieces (R2 = 0.992) with exceptions at the front- and
back-end of the distribution; very frequently and very infrequently
occurring pieces deviated from this relationship. An inspection of
these deviations revealed that the very frequently occurring pieces
were wheels, hubs, and axes; arguably indispensable components
of a car. The very infrequently used pieces seemed to be largely
non-functional pieces that were neither necessary nor typical of
cars and possessed little in the way of aesthetic or ornamental
quality (see examples in Figure 3).
The broad, logarithmic distribution of pieces in between seem
to fall on a continuum of highly functional (such as larger
plates used to construct the chassis of a car) and highly stereo-
typical pieces (such as round, transparent pieces that typically
served as car lights) on the high-frequency end, and increasingly
non-functional pieces on the low-frequency end.
To investigate how cars developed across sessions, we investi-
gated the average carry-over effect in pieces from one car to the
next. The similarity between consecutively built cars increased
from session to session (see Figure 4A); consecutive cars shared
a greater and greater percentage of the same kinds of pieces
[F(2,104) = 6.84, p = 0.002, η = 0.116]. Interestingly, there was
also an increasing inﬂuence of the ﬁrst model on consecutively
built models, as models constructed in subsequent sessions shared
an increasing amount of pieces with the very ﬁrst model car built
[F(2,104) = 6.31, p = 0.003, η = 0.108], as demonstrated in
Figure 4B.
To investigate the rates of productivity across different building
sessions, we calculated the size of each car (i.e., the number of
its component pieces) and subjected the measure of car size to a
repeated measures ANOVA with the factor session number (1, 2, 3,
4). As can be seen in Figure 5, cars grew bigger across the building
sessions [F(3,156) = 18.80, p < 0.001, η = 0.266].
To investigate how design features changed across building ses-
sions, we calculated the dominant color used in the four building
sessions by each pair of participants. This was done by calcu-
lating the percentage of LEGOs within each color category for
each car, and then summing that percentage across all four cars
built by each pair. We then investigated how the percentage of
the dominant color changed across the four building sessions,
subjecting the percentages to a repeated measure ANOVA with
the factor session number (1, 2, 3, 4). As shown in Figure 6,
the proportion of the dominant color was strongest in the ﬁrst
model and dropped off from session 1 to 2, but then increased
steadily from sessions 2 to 4 [F(3,156) = 16.27, p < 0.001,
η = 0.238].
While most of the aforementioned measures refer to patterns
derived from within-pair comparisons across the four sessions,
we also performed a between-pairs comparison of the overlap in
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FIGURE 3 | Plot of the logarithm of number of pieces vs. the rank-order
of pieces.The middle part of the distribution is characterized by a strong
relationship between functional/stereotypical vs. ornamental pieces. The
front-end of the distribution marks fundamental, indispensable pieces
(wheels and axes), while the back-end features increasingly non-functional,
non-ornamental pieces.
FIGURE 4 | Overlap of pieces between cars constructed in consecutive sessions (A) and overlap of pieces between the car built in the very first
session compared to cars built in all subsequent sessions (B). Cars constructed in later sessions showed an increasingly greater overlap with their
predecessors, and with the very ﬁrst models.
LEGOs for sessions 1, 2, 3, and 4. As shown in Figure 7, the simi-
larity of cars within each session, quantiﬁed as the average number
of pieces shared, did not differ as a function of building session.
To investigate the diversity of cars across sessions, we calculated
the average overlap of pieces between all the cars constructed in
each session [F(3,204) = 0.79, p = 0.502].
DISCUSSION
As demonstrated in Figure 3, all car models featured many
things in common. This almost certainly derives from the cul-
turally mediated schemas participants share. Coming into the
experimental setup with similar schemas exerts non-trivial inﬂu-
ences on behavior since it greatly accelerates coordination among
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FIGURE 5 | Car size as a function of building session. In successive
building sessions, the car size, as measured by number of pieces,
increases.
FIGURE 6 | Proportion of the dominant color in a car model as a
function of building session.The prominence of the dominant color in a
car was strongest in the ﬁrst building session and dropped from the ﬁrst to
the second session, only to steadily increase across the remaining three
sessions.
FIGURE 7 | Overlap of pieces between cars constructed by different
pairs, but in the same session.The similarity of cars within each session,
quantiﬁed as the average number of pieces shared, did not differ as a
function of building session.
participants (e.g., they do not have to puzzle over what the word
for car means or what a car should basically look like). More-
over, these shared schemas immediately reduce the possibilities
given the large set of LEGOs; since individual building bricks are
more or less important for constructing a model car, the actual
set of LEGOs and their combinations far exceeds the usable set for
accomplishing the task.
Translating the basics of car design into a LEGO model posed
no real challenge for the pairs. They are heirs of a technologi-
cal culture that worked out the basics of wheeled transport over
many centuries. For example, cars cannot be built in such a way
that two of their wheels roll in one direction while the other two
roll perpendicular to that direction. Participants, because of the
schemas they shared, did not need to engage in fruitless exper-
iments regarding the alignment of wheels or hundreds of other
possibilities that run counter to the basic template of a car; his-
tory had accomplished this work already. Perhaps they did not
realize it, but all participants came into the experimental setting
with all the know-how they required to build model cars from
the very ﬁrst building session. This is a signiﬁcant point since
people in other times and places would have no such knowledge,
individually or collectively. It is because of this simple fact that
an experiment like this can capture something meaningful about
culture.
In constructing their ﬁrst model, pairs negotiated signiﬁcant
coordination costs—they needed to learn how to successfully
work with each other in achieving the task—that, once paid,
could be reliably recaptured in each successive building session by
working together in similar ways and producing a model that basi-
cally conformed to the prior models they had already produced.
Successful coordination became increasingly predictable by adher-
ing to designs that reiﬁed their prior coordination patterns. Car
designs became more and more standardized across sessions, but
they also grew from one session to the next. This increase in the
number of pieces used for each car demonstrates something like
a “ratchet effect” (Tomasello, 1999a, 37–41) in that the efﬁcien-
cies of adopting conventions established in earlier sessions freed
up resources (particularly time) for additional modiﬁcations in
later sessions. Tomasello describes the ratchet effect as the abil-
ity, peculiar to humans alone, to faithfully learn and preserve
innovations over time, and generations, which permits additional
modiﬁcations to accumulate. This human capacity is ratchet-like
not only because it slowly cranks things upward in complexity,
but also because it prevents slippage that might cause innova-
tions to be dropped (i.e., lost or forgotten; Tan and Fay, 2011).
The kind of imitative learning that already begins to show up in
triadic interactions leads to the “cumulative cultural complexity”
that deﬁnes human culture; it is a form of inheritance that ties
human bodies and minds to their artifacts, all of which have “cul-
tural histories” (Tomasello, 2006, 206). As Tomasello (2006, 205)
notes: “. . .none of the most complex human artifacts or social
practices—including tool industries, symbolic artifacts, and social
institutions—were invented once and for all at a single moment by
any one individual or group of individuals. Rather, what happened
was that some individual or group of individuals ﬁrst invented a
primitive version of the artifact or practice, and then some later
user or users made a modiﬁcation, an improvement, that others
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then adopted perhaps without change for many generations, at
which point some other individual or group of individuals made
another modiﬁcation, which was then learned and used by oth-
ers, and so on over historical time.” Tomasello concludes that
just a few basic, though momentous, abilities which distinguish
us from our nearest kin, the chimpanzees, were required for the
development of human culture which he sees as our ability to
create “history.” And history is not simply having a past, but the
intentional preservation of the past—through memories, actions,
and objects—so that it may have relevance for the present and
future.
Given that participants began each sessionwith the identical set
of building bricks, it might be expected that they would produce
four unique models. After all, the number of LEGO bricks used for
an average car model produces immense combinatorial possibili-
ties. However, as seen in the results, this was not the case. Others
might expect that because participants’ schemas about cars are so
similar, the pairs might ﬁnd it most efﬁcient to employ a “status
quo” bias (Kahneman et al., 1991), essentially producing the same
model again and again. As can be seen in the results, though, this
is far from the stepwise progressions exhibited in the actual com-
parisons. The data revealed a surprising pattern in the selection of
building bricks as well as features of car design across consecutive
building sessions. The model in each later session demonstrated
an increasing reliance on the model which immediately preceded
it. Additionally, the very ﬁrst model served an increasingly impor-
tant role as a design template in each later session. As expressed by
the cars themselves, each pair of participants seems to have con-
solidated their schematic representations of LEGO model cars, so
that they became increasingly convinced what a LEGO car“ought”
look like as they proceeded from one session to the next.
THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY
When looking over the results, a set of stepwise progressions shows
up across numerous measures. We identify these patterns as “path
dependence” (David, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Garud
and Karnøe, 2001b) demonstrative of rapid conventionalization.
Path dependence refers to the ability of inﬂuences from the past,
usually near the beginning of a phenomenon, to strongly constrain
aspects of its future. This often occurs even when the early con-
ditions have little functional relevance for later conditions. Garud
and Karnøe (2001a, 4) describe how “phenomena are sensitive to
small differences in the underlying sequence of events” such that
“a steady accumulation of small differences can result in the tech-
nological ﬁeld locking onto a trajectory.” In broad terms, path
dependence exhibits the persistence of past states in future states
and has often been discussed using the truism “history matters”
(North, 1990, 100; David, 2001).
The notion of path dependence has been inﬂuential in eco-
nomic theory, where scholars have often invoked it to explain
inefﬁciencies that endure in spite of seemingly superior alterna-
tives (Liebowitz andMargolis, 1995). Examples from technological
history have played an important role in demonstrating the power
of path dependence. David (1985) described how early models of
typewriters required organizing the keyboard using the QWERTY
layout that has dominated ever since. However, the mechani-
cal reasons for implementing this format ceased to be relevant
a short time later, as new mechanisms were introduced. And,
of course, these mechanical constraints have no relevance for
computer keyboards which use an entirely different implemen-
tation to link keystroke inputs to graphic outputs. The QWERTY
layout has endured in spite of reasoned alternatives at the time
and greatly superior alternatives at later times. In the 1930s, a
pair of education professors by the name of Dvorak and Dealey
developed a keyboard conﬁguration that permits users to type
much faster while also reducing errors and strain (see Noyes,
1983). Nevertheless, the ready availability of QWERTY typewrit-
ers ensured that the majority of typists would learn using this
layout and the fact that the majority of typists continued to learn
the QWERTY format ensured that manufacturers would continue
producing such machines in greater and greater quantities over
time.
This example highlights how path dependence relies on “pos-
itive feedback,” the ampliﬁcation of an effect by its inﬂuence on
the processes which give rise to it. The fact that there is a superior
alternative to the QWERTY layout and that rational consumers
ought to select the superior format over the inferior one—as many
economic models would predict—is not, in fact, what occurred.
Mechanical constraints at an early stage of development neces-
sitated a particular layout which has dominated ever since, in
spite of better alternatives. According to adherents of the path
dependence model, this suggests that history can trump power-
ful competing principles: “History then is the tool to understand
what rationality and efﬁciency do not explain, that is, the ran-
dom sequence of insigniﬁcant events that are not addressable by
economic theory” (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995, 17–18). As is
evident in this case, as well as in many other instances of history—
from the demise of the dinosaurs due to a stray meteor to the
discovery of the American continents by sailors searching for a
quicker route to Asia—contingent events, that is, events which
might have transpired in some other way, often change things in
ways that cannot be foreseen, even using the best scientiﬁc models
at our disposal. In similar fashion, participants had tremendous
freedom in developing their ﬁrst car models but the relatively arbi-
trary forms they settled upon exerted downstream inﬂuences on
all their later models, an effect very much like path dependence
(see Figure 8).
Relating these ﬁndings to evolutionary theory, Stephen Jay
Gould’s book, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of
History, offers a provocative interpretive framework. In the book,
Gould investigates the signiﬁcance of the “Cambrian explosion,”
a geological period that began around 540 million years ago, for
the theory of evolution. In just 60 million years, life went from
a small variety of relatively simple organisms to a huge diversity
of complex organisms; almost all animal phyla (“the fundamen-
tal ground plans of anatomy”) developed in this period and very
few new ones have come into being in the 500 million years after-
ward. The most remarkable ﬁnding, according to Gould, is not
that this proliferation occurred, but that animals on Earth today
evolved from only a fraction of those which existed during this
proliﬁc era. Instead of a continued diversiﬁcation of organisms,
as exhibited during the Cambrian explosion, a small sample from
that time served as ancestors for all later life. Gould (1989, 47)
notes that “the later history of life proceeded by elimination,
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FIGURE 8 | Sets of cars demonstrating varying degrees of path dependence.
not expansion. The current earth may hold more species than
ever before, but most are iterations upon a few basic anatomical
designs.” Much impressed with the odd, often fantastic, anatom-
ical varieties present in the Cambrian period (and preserved in
the Burgess Shale), Gould (1989, 47) observes that “later history
is a tale of restriction, as most of these early experiments suc-
cumb and life settles down to generating endless variants upon
a few surviving models.” Gould argues that once a basic form
proves to be successful it begins to reproduce rapidly and its
variations become increasingly subtle over time. There are fewer
and fewer grand design changes of the sort that would revoke
the “ground plans of its anatomy” and potentially lead to a new
phylum. What is common to both the path dependence litera-
ture, particularly in relation to technology, and to evolutionary
theory is that big innovations early on establish a path which all
later members of the type follow. Whether it be the dominance
of the QWERTY layout over and against novel keyboard layouts
a short time later or the hegemony of a subset of phyla for more
than 500 million years, a principle of evolution seems to be that
basic forms established early on consolidate their hold and prevent
interloper designs from entering their niche. This process reduces
diversity of form but accelerates increasingly speciﬁc processes of
optimization.
Just as Gould might have predicted, our results demonstrate
the inordinate importance of the ﬁrst car model for shaping later
models. While the nature of the experimental setup provides par-
ticipants with a set of conditions to produce four novel designs,
the opposite, in fact, occurs. Reﬂecting on the evolutionary pro-
cess, Gould (1989, 321) notes how “little quirks at the outset,
occurring for no particular reason, unleash cascades of conse-
quences thatmake aparticular future seem inevitable in retrospect.
But the slightest early nudge contacts a different groove, and his-
tory veers into another plausible channel, diverging continually
from its original pathway. The end results are so different, the
initial perturbation so apparently trivial.” Instead of evolutionary
processes completely determining the nature and scope of life, he
asserts “history as the chief determinant of life’s directions” (1989,
288). Similarly, each pair’s ﬁrst car model, that ﬁrst concatena-
tion of arbitrary design decisions and brick selections, served as
a design template for all later building sessions, which ended up
as variations upon a theme. And just as with the distinctive phyla
established during the Cambrian, car designs made by different
pairs showed no convergence (see Figure 7). This seems to indi-
cate that there were no constraints or attractors based on function
or optimality that would cause all pairs to converge toward an
“ideal” design. Instead, it is as if those arbitrary ﬁrst designs estab-
lished distinctive channels which, while running concurrently and
in parallel, did not have any particular aim toward which they
might evolve.
Stuart Kauffman (1995, 195), a theoretical biologist and com-
plexity theorist, and Gould are in agreement regarding the general
pattern of life since the Cambrian explosion, namely that once
“species with a number of major body plans sprang into exis-
tence, this radical creativity slowed and then dwindled to slight
tinkering. Evolution concentrated its sights closer to home, tinker-
ing and adding ﬁligree to its inventions.” This reduction in basic
diversity relates to the ampliﬁcation of “conﬂicting constraints” as
organisms become increasingly “locked in” to their fundamental
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anatomy (1995, 199–201) and as all evolving life becomes more
and more competent for its niche so that interlopers face greater
competition.
Kauffman (1995, 202) takes this“Cambrian pattern of diversiﬁ-
cation” even further, believing it to be exhibited in a wide range of
complex phenomena, including technological evolution: “...given
a fundamental innovation—gun, bicycle, car, airplane—it appears
to be common to ﬁnd a wide range of dramatic early experimen-
tation with radically different forms, which branch further and
then settle down to a few dominant lineages.” To be clear, nei-
ther Gould nor Kauffman argue against the increase of overall
diversity through evolutionary processes, but posit a reduction
in the diversity of basic forms, what corresponds to the level of
phyla in biological taxonomy. Subsequently, increased diversiﬁ-
cation happens at lower taxonomic ranks, particularly through
speciation. Reviewing his juxtaposition of theCambrian explosion
with technological evolution, Kauffman (1995, 205) concludes:
“the parallels are striking, and it seems worthwhile to consider
seriously the possibility that the patterns of branching radiation
in biological and technological evolution are governed by sim-
ilar general laws. . .tissues and terra-cotta may indeed evolve in
similar ways. General laws may govern the evolution of com-
plex entities, whether they are works of nature or works of man.”
Kauffman’s assertion that a Cambrian pattern of diversiﬁcation
may be applicable to technological evolution would seem to be
exhibited in the results of this joint action study. The ﬁrst car
established something like a “phylum”which consolidated in each
successive session. This pattern seemed to apply both to the
LEGO bricks selected as well as the dominant color participants
settled upon. The results seen in this study may exhibit larger
dynamics of cultural evolution, a set of dynamics that fall in line
with the phenomenon called path dependence. And while the
warrant is tentative, similar dynamics may also shape complex
phenomena as diverse as anatomical structures and the evolution
of technology.
CONCLUSION
Few would argue against Tomasello’s description of the ratchet
effect leading to“cumulative cultural complexity,” but most would
assume this to mean increasing diversiﬁcation as time goes for-
ward. The argument here is that the cumulative complexity of
culture occurs in a subtle fashion: for any cultural innovation,
experiments in basic form lead soon thereafter to processes of
reduction and elimination as a dominant path is established.
From that moment onward, increasingly small, and gradual,
modiﬁcations reiterate the basics of the original form.
Given the results of this “proof of concept” study, it would
seem that applying evolutionary theory to the study of culture is
a generative exercise. And this would seem to be true in spite of
the fact that the phenomena in question, biological transforma-
tion over time and cultural transformation over time, operate on
qualitatively different “kinds.” Biology and culture are continu-
ous, but they are clearly not the same thing; transformation over
time, however, refers to a set of processes that may well apply to
a wide range of phenomena. In pursuit of this, we have utilized
ideas about path dependence in our analysis of the products of
joint action. A prominent pattern across many phenomena is a
reduction in the diversity of basic forms over time. Based on these
ﬁndings, it is reasonable to conclude that solutions to invariant
tasks and challenges need not be endlessly novel, thus draining
energy and resources from other tasks and challenges; an earlier
solution that has already proven to be satisfactory is the founda-
tion upon which subtler optimizing processes can set to work. An
additional reduction in variability derives from shared schemas
that facilitate intersubjective as well as interobjective coordina-
tion. The possession and use of schemas means that we approach
a task with many ideas about the world shared in common. Even
though these ideas greatly constrain potential variability, their use-
fulness in promoting coordination enhances overall efﬁciency. As
present and subsequent experience can be made to “more or less”
accommodate prior expectations, and update those expectations,
the adjustments necessary to succeed in the present are greatly
reduced in both time and complexity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank L. Seitzberg, C. Larsen, and J. Aaris for their assistance
with the study and R. Fusaroli for reviewing an early draft of
the paper. Additionally, our study would not have been possible
without B. Thomsen and T. Sørensen of the LEGO Foundation.
This work was supported by the Marie Curie Initial Training Net-
work, “TESIS: Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity”
(FP7-PEOPLE-2010-ITN, 264828).
REFERENCES
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.
New York: Macmillan.
Basalla, G. (1988). The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Bjørndahl, J. S., Fusaroli, R., Østergaard, S., and Tylén, K. (2014). Thinking together
with material representations: joint epistemic actions in creative problem solving.
Cogn. Semiot. 7, 103–123. doi: 10.1515/cogsem-2014-0006
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (2005). The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (2009). Culture and the evolution of human coop-
eration. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 364, 3281–3288. doi: 10.1098/rstb.
2009.0134
Clark, H. H., and Krych, M. A. (2004). Speaking while monitoring addressees for
understanding. J. Mem. Lang. 50, 62–81. doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2003.08.004
D’Andrade, R. G. (1995). The Development of Cognitive Anthropology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Dale, R., Fusaroli, R., Duran, N. D., and Richardson, D. C. (2014). “The self-
organization of human interaction,” in Psychology of Learning and Motivation,
Vol. 59, ed. B. Ross (Burlington, MA: Academic Press), 43–96. doi: 10.1016/B978-
0-12-407187-2.00002-2
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. London:
John Murray.
Darwin, C. (1890). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 2nd Edn.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. Am. Econ. Rev. 75,
332–337.
David, P. A. (2001). “Path dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical eco-
nomics’, ” in Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present,
eds P. Garrouste and S. Ioannides (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing),
15–40.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selﬁsh Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Jaegher, H., and Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenol.
Cogn. Sci. 6, 485–507. doi: 10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9
Di Paolo, E., Rohde,M., andDe Jaegher,H. (2010). “Horizons for the enactivemind,”
in Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J. R. Stewart, O.
Gapenne, and E. Di Paolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 33–87.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1017 | 10
McGraw et al. Culture’s building blocks
Dobzhansky, T. (1937). Genetics and the Origin of Species. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of
Culture and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ehrlich, P. R., and Ehrlich, A. H. (2008). The Dominant Animal: Human Evolution
and the Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Enﬁeld, N. J. (2000). The theory of cultural logic. Cult. Dyn. 12, 35–64. doi:
10.1177/092137400001200102
Filipchenko, Y. A. (1927). Variabilität und Variation. Berlin: Gebrüder Borntraeger.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Conscious.
Cogn. 17, 535–543. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003
Gallese, V. (2001). The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: From mirror neurons to
empathy. J. Conscious. Stud. 8, 33–50.
Gallotti, M., and Frith, C. D. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 17, 160–165. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.002
Galton, F. (1869). Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences.
London: Macmillan and Co.
Garrod, S., Fay, N., Lee, J., Oberlander, J., and MacLeod, T. (2007). Foundations of
representation: where might graphical symbol systems come from? Cogn. Sci. 31,
961–987. doi: 10.1080/03640210701703659
Garud, R., and Karnøe, P. (2001a). “Path creation as a process of mindful deviation,”
in Path Dependence and Creation, eds R. Garud and P. Karnøe (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 1–40.
Garud, R., and Karnøe, P. (2001b). Path Dependence and Creation, LEA’s
Organization andManagement Series. Mahwah,NJ: LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.
Goodwin, C. (2000). Action and embodiment within situated human
interaction. J. Pragmat. 32, 1489–1522. doi: 10.1016/S0378-2166(99)
00096-X
Gould, S. J. (1989). Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, 1st
Edn. New York: W.W. Norton.
Haeckel, E. (1900). The Riddle of the Universe at the Close of the Nineteenth Century,
trans. Joseph McCabe. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Hobson, R. P. (2002). The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking.
London: Macmillan.
Hodder, I. (2012). Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships Between Humans
and Things. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Huxley, J. (1942). Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. London: G. Allen & Unwin.
Ingold, T. (2000). The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling
& Skill. London: Routledge.
Johannsen, N., Löfﬂer, D., and McGraw, J. J. (2014). “Waffengeschichte,” in Entwick-
lungen der Menschheit. Integrative Humanwissenschaft als Fächerverbindende
Forschungskooperative, ed. G. Jüttemann (Eichengrund: Pabst SciencePublishers).
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: the endowment
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. J. Econ. Perspect. 5, 193–206. doi:
10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Kauffman, S. A. (1995). At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kirsh, D. (2010). “Explaining artifact evolution,” in The Cognitive Life of
Things: Recasting Boundaries of the Mind, eds L. Malafouris and C.
Renfrew (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research),
121–144.
Kiverstein, J., and Farina, M. (2011). Embraining culture: leaky minds and spongy
brains. Teorema Rev. Int. Filos. 30, 35–54.
Knoblich, G., Butterﬁll, S., and Sebanz, N. (2011). “Psychological research on joint
action: theory and data,” in Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 54, ed. B.
Ross (Burlington, MA: Academic Press), 59–101.
Latour, B. (1996). On interobjectivity. Mind Cult. Act. 3, 228–245. doi:
10.1207/s15327884mca0304_2
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lende, D. H., and Downey, G. (2012). The Encultured Brain: An Introduction to
Neuroanthropology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Levy, G. (2012). Judaic Technologies of the Word: Cognitive Perspectives on Judaism
and Jewish Cultural Formation. Shefﬁeld: Equinox Press.
Liebowitz, S. J., and Margolis, S. E. (1995). Path dependence, lock-in, and history.
J. Law Econ. Organ. 11, 205–226. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1706450
Lorenz, K. (1937). Über die Bildung des Instinktbegriffes. Naturwissenschaften 25,
289–300. doi: 10.1007/BF01492648
Luria, A. R. (1976). Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Malafouris, L. (2013). HowThings Shape theMind: ATheory of Material Engagement.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Malafouris, L., and Renfrew, C. (eds). (2010). The Cognitive Life of Things: Recast-
ing Boundaries of the Mind. Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological
Research.
Mayr, E. (1942). Systematics and the Origin of Species from the Viewpoint of a
Zoologist, Columbia Biological Series. New York: Columbia University Press.
McGraw, J. J. (2007). Religion as Representations: Towards a Reconciliation of
Schema Theory and the Cognitive Science of Religion. M.A. thesis, Department
of Anthropology, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA.
Meskell, L. (2005). “Objects in themirror appear closer than they are,” inMateriality,
ed. D. Miller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 51–71.
Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory can Explain Human
Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Michael, J. (2011). Shared emotions and joint action. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 2, 355–373.
doi: 10.1007/s13164-011-0055-2
Miller, D. (ed.). (1998). Material Cultures: Why Some Things Matter. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Miller, D. (ed.). (2005). Materiality. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,
The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Noyes, J. (1983). The QWERTY keyboard: a review. Int. J. Man Mach. Stud. 18,
265–281. doi: 10.1016/S0020-7373(83)80010-8
Parsons, T. (1966). Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Piaget, J. (1952). The Origins of Intelligence in Children. New York: International
Universities Press.
Quinn, N. (2005). Finding Culture in Talk: A Collection of Methods. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Reddy, V. (2008). How Infants Know Minds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Risjord, M. (2007). “Ethnography and culture,” in Philosophy of Anthropol-
ogy and Sociology, eds S. P. Turner and M. W. Risjord, (Oxford: Elsevier),
399–428.
Risjord, M. (2012). “Models of culture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Social Science, ed. H. Kincaid (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 387–408.
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in Social
Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rogoff, B. (2003). The Cultural Nature of Human Development. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Rosenthal, V. (2004). “Microgenesis, immediate experience and visual processes in
reading,” in Action, Gesture and Symbol: The Emergence of Language, ed. A. Lock
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 183–229.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). “Schemata: the building blocks of cognition,” inTheoretical
Issues in Reading Comprehension: Perspectives from Cognitive Psychology, Linguis-
tics, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, and Education, eds R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, and W. F.
Brewer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson’s University Library.
Scheler, M. (1954). The Nature of Sympathy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Schönpﬂug, U. (2008). Cultural Transmission: Psychological, Developmental, Social,
and Methodological Aspects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shore, B. (1996). Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sinha, C. (2005). Blending out of the background: play, props and staging in the
material world. J. Pragmat. 37, 1537–1554. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2004.09.011
Sinha, C. (2009). Objects in a storied world: materiality, normativity, narrativity.
J. Conscious. Stud. 16, 167–190.
Sinha, C., and Rodríguez, C. (2008). “Language and the signifying object: from
convention to imagination,” in The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity,
eds J. Zlatev, T. P. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company), 357–378.
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1017 | 11
McGraw et al. Culture’s building blocks
Spencer, H. (1864). First Principles of a New System of Philosophy. New York, NY: D.
Appleton and company.
Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sterelny, K. (2012). The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution made Humans Unique,
Jean Nicod lectures. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Steward, J. H. (1955). Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear
Evolution. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Stewart, J. R., Gapenne, O., and Di Paolo, E. (2010). Enaction: Toward a New
Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tan, R., and Fay, N. (2011). Cultural transmission in the labora-
tory: agent interaction improves the intergenerational transfer of informa-
tion. Evol. Hum. Behav. 32, 399–406. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.
01.001
Tinbergen, N. (1951). The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tomasello, M. (1999a). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M. (1999b). The human adaptation for culture. Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 28,
509–529. doi: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.509
Tomasello, M. (2006). “Uniquely human cognition is a product of human culture,”
in Evolution and Culture: a Fyssen Foundation Symposium, eds S. C. Levinson and
P. Jaisson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 203–217.
Tomasello,M. (2008). “Cultural transmission: a view from chimpanzees and human
infants.” in Cultural Transmission: Psychological, Developmental, Social, and
Methodological Aspects, ed. U. Schönpﬂug (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), 33–47.
Tomasello, M., and Carpenter, M. (2007). Shared intentionality. Dev. Sci. 10, 121–
125. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x
Tomasello,M., Carpenter,M., Call, J., Behne, T., andMoll,H. (2005). Understanding
and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 28,
675–691. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X05000129
Trevarthen, C., and Hubley, P. (1978). “Secondary intersubjectivity: conﬁdence,
conﬁding and acts of meaning in the ﬁrst year,” in Action, Gesture, and Symbol:
The Emergence of Language, ed. A. Lock (NewYork,NY:Academic Press), 183–229.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive
Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological
Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Werner, H. (1957). Comparative Psychology of Mental Development, Revised Edn.
New York: International Universities Press.
Wexler, B. E. (2006). Brain and Culture: Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Williams, R. F. (2004). Making Meaning from a Clock: Material Artifacts and Concep-
tual Blending in Time-Telling Instruction. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Cognitive
Science, University of California San Diego, La jolla, CA.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Wood, D., Bruner, J. S., and Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in problem
solving. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 17, 89–100. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.1976.
tb00381.x
Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 514–
522. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.010
Zlatev, J., Racine, T. P., Sinha, C., and Itkonen, E. (2008). “Intersubjectivity: what
makes us human?,” in The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity, eds
J. Zlatev, T. P. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company), 1–14.
Conflict of Interest Statement:The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 14 May 2014; accepted: 26 August 2014; published online: 12 September
2014.
Citation: McGraw JJ, Wallot S, Mitkidis P and Roepstorff A (2014) Culture’s building
blocks: investigating cultural evolution in a LEGO construction task. Front. Psychol.
5:1017. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01017
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 McGraw, Wallot, Mitkidis and Roepstorff. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permit-
ted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1017 | 12
